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ALL THE WORLD WIDE WEB IS A STAGE: 
FREE SPEECH, EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, 
AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE  
YOUR AUDIENCE 
Abstract: To determine whether punishing the disclosure of illegally ob-
tained information violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
speech, the Supreme Court currently applies a public concern test. Previ-
ously, the primary example of this conflict was the use of state or federal 
wiretapping statutes to punish television journalists broadcasting wire-
tapped conversations. Today, the same statutes may punish individuals dis-
tributing similar recordings on the Internet. Because of the increasing im-
portance of online communication and the increasing concern about off-
line conduct being posted online, an appropriate First Amendment 
framework must balance the rights of the public to obtain information, the 
rights of the media to disclose information, and the rights of speakers to 
determine their audience. The public concern test fails in this endeavor. 
Instead, courts should balance the right to disclose the recording against 
the recorded speaker’s right to freedom of association. This approach re-
jects a dichotomy between public and private as ill-suited to online com-
munication and instead focuses on protecting the rights of speakers to 
choose their audience. Grounded in the First Amendment’s protection of 
expressive association and anonymous speech, this Note proposes that the 
need to protect unpopular or minority viewpoints from unwanted online 
publicity justifies limits on the dissemination of certain types of recordings. 
Introduction 
 Imagine that someone running for local office calls a friend.1 They 
discuss a local union race and mention they want to “blow [the] porch-
es” off the opposition.2 This phone call is surreptitiously wiretapped, 
which is against federal law.3 The next day, the phone call is broadcast 
on a local radio talk show.4 Based on the cause of action created by 
                                                                                                                      
1See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518–19 (2001) (presenting a similar factual sce-
nario). 
2 See id. (quoting plaintiff as saying, “If they’re not gonna move for three percent, 
we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . . To blow off their front porches, we’ll 
have to do some work on some of those guys.” (alteration in original)). 
3 See id. at 517. 
4 See id. at 519. 
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anti-wiretapping statutes—laws that prohibit the creation and distribu-
tion of surreptitious recordings—the recorded candidate sues the radio 
host.5 The candidate loses.6 
  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, decided in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that a media outlet, like the radio host, who receives a recording 
without knowledge of the illegal activity, cannot be punished consistent 
with the First Amendment when the subject of the recording is a matter 
of public concern, such as speech about political issues but not “daily 
life” or entertainment issues.7 
 Fast forward ten years, and imagine that someone gave the re-
cording to a blogger instead of a talk show host.8 The case presents the 
same facts and arises under the same statutes, but would the outcome 
be the same if the recording at issue is posted on the Internet?9 What 
about the woman who fell into a fountain at a mall while sending a text 
message and recently brought suit against the mall security personnel 
who posted the misadventure online?10 Today, the proliferation of cam-
era phone recording and Internet video-sharing technology increases 
the likelihood of wiretapping suits brought against individual, nonme-
dia defendants and of constitutional challenge to anti-wiretapping stat-
utes.11 
 When balancing an anti-wiretapping statute’s goal of preventing 
the chilling of private discourse and the First Amendment’s goal of lim-
iting tort liability in situations where it might chill public discourse on a 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. 
6 See id. at 518. 
7 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: 
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 
1049, 1095 (2000) (explaining the scope of the public concern test). 
8 See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, 
and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2011) (examining when the First 
Amendment should protect image capture). 
9 See id. Although no case has squarely addressed the issue, some scholars have consid-
ered the impact of camera phone technology and the Internet on freedom of speech and 
privacy. See id.; Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for 
Digital Video, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 919, 926--32 (2010). 
10 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Woman Whose Fountain Fall Is a YouTube Hit Considers Suing 
over Video Release, A.B.A. J. ( Jan. 21 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
women_whose_fountain_fall_is_a_youtube_hit_considers_suing_over_video_relea/it_con 
siders_suing_over_video_relea/ (describing why a woman who fell in a mall fountain while 
texting was considering suing the person who posted the surveillance video of her fall 
online). 
11 See generally Kreimer, supra note 8 (examining legal challenges created by the preva-
lence of digital image capture technology). 
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particular subject, two First Amendment values inevitably collide.12 
Which values are more important: the public speech or the private 
speech, the public’s right to know and learn through robust public dis-
course or an individual’s rights to associate privately to discuss contro-
versial issues?13 
 Here, determining whether the disclosed matter is of public con-
cern, as the Supreme Court did in Bartnicki, is frequently futile.14 If we 
want the First Amendment to encourage discourse on a broad range of 
issues, we presumably want to encourage that information to be dis-
cussed both privately and publicly.15 In his concurring opinion in Bart-
nicki, Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted this intuition—that wiretap-
ping statutes have both speech-enhancing and speech-restricting ef-
fects.16 Although Justice Breyer ultimately used the majority’s public 
concern test, his opinion provides a starting point for a more practical 
way to balance the right to private conversation, the right of the public 
to receive information, and the right of the media to disclose informa-
tion.17 
 This Note argues that the First Amendment’s protection of both 
private and public expressive association and its near absolute protec-
tion for the publication of speech on matters of public concern are ir-
reconcilable as applied to online speech and should be replaced with a 
framework that recognizes the rights of speakers to control their audi-
ence.18 Furthermore, the wide availability of video and audio recording 
technology, coupled with the ability of individuals to rapidly and widely 
disseminate information both to their peers and others makes collision 
between these two values inevitable in the digital age.19 Thus, develop-
                                                                                                                      
 
12 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that anti-wire-
tapping statutes have both speech-restricting and speech-enhancing effects because privacy 
can encourage expression); see also Paul Gerwirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
139, 140 (criticizing the majority in Bartnicki for not giving enough weight to the speech-
enhancing effects of privacy in communication). 
13 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“By protecting the privacy 
of individual thought and expression, [wiretapping] statutes further the uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open speech of the private parties.” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
17 See id. at 535; see also Gerwirtz, supra note 12, at 158 (explaining the speech-
enhancing effect, speech-restricting effect test proposed by Justice Breyer). 
18 See infra notes 193–305 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your 
Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Internet, 49 
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ing a coherent constitutional framework to evaluate the validity of wire-
tap statutes and other laws passed to protect privacy and association 
rights from online disclosure is extremely important.20 Currently, states 
lack a uniform approach to anti-wiretapping laws designed to protect 
individuals against the intrusive disclosure of sound and video re-
cordings, and in response to online mischief, many states have passed 
or are considering laws that more aggressively prohibit such disclo-
sures.21 
  Part I of this Note examines how Bartnicki immunizes speakers 
who make certain disclosures from punishment and surveys associa-
tional freedom cases and their protection of conversations against dis-
closure.22 Part II illustrates advances in Internet video-sharing and so-
cial media technology that carry important implications for the analysis 
of these conflicting rights.23 Part III then proposes an associational 
freedom framework for balancing the public’s right to know, the me-
dia’s right to disclose, and the rights of the literal speaker.24 This Part 
also argues that this approach would help courts reach different, more 
desirable results than either the current public concern approach or a 
more privacy-protective approach.25 
                                                                                                                      
Santa Clara L. Rev. 313, 314 (2009) (arguing for a right against third-party recording); 
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 339 (advocating for a right to record and photograph). 
20See Lipton, supra note 9, at 926–32 (listing recent state law approaches to punishing 
the dissemination of surreptitious photographing and recording). Although many scholars 
have critiqued Bartnicki from a privacy-protective perspective, scholars have not grounded 
criticism in the First Amendment’s protection of association. See, e.g., Gerwirtz, supra note 
12, at 140; Lipton, supra note 9, at 920; Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justify-
ing Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L.J. 967, 976 (2003). Outside the re-
cording context, expanding protection for freedom of association to online speech has 
been addressed by at least one scholar. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in 
a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 
784 (2008) (arguing that First Amendment protection of freedom of association should 
regulate how the government monitors Internet traffic data). This scholar, however, fo-
cuses on protecting individuals against government surveillance, not against private-party 
recordings. See id. 
21 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 726–32. 
22 See infra notes 26–110 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 111–192 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 193–305 and accompanying text. This Note uses the term “literal 
speaker” to distinguish the recorded party from other speakers like the media who relay 
the information. See infra notes 193–305 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 193–305 and accompanying text. 
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I. Conflicting Speech Rights: Requiring Disclosure  
on Matters of Public Concern and Prohibiting  
Disclosures That Chill Association 
 Usually, the public concern test is used as a defense to a claim 
brought under an otherwise valid, generally applicable statute that inci-
dentally restricts speech.26 Effectively, defendants can use the First 
Amendment as a trump card—even if the defendant did what the stat-
ute prohibited, the defendant argues his conviction is unconstitutional 
because the First Amendment always protects speech on matters of pub-
lic concern.27 In the face of laws that punish certain kinds of speech, 
exempting speech of public concern enhances discourse by encourag-
ing more disclosure.28 
 Associational freedom and anonymity cases, however, enhance 
speech in a different way.29 The protection of associational freedom 
and anonymous speech focuses on the rights of speakers to be free 
from governmental interference with either their messages or the 
scope of their audiences based on the assumption that unwanted 
speech or disclosures might chill the discourse of the group.30 Thus, in 
contrast to protecting speakers who disclose information of public con-
cern, associational freedom and anonymity cases establish that the First 
Amendment can protect speakers from disclosure.31 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After El-
dred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697, 713 (2003). 
27 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1050–62 
(2006) (examining the use of the public concern test to limit liability in various contexts, 
including libel law). 
28 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”). 
29 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (prohibiting the court-
ordered disclosure of membership lists because “freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of . . . freedom of speech” and 
establishing that “it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association 
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters”). 
30 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (holding that the 
ability to control membership is “crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views 
on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas”). 
31 See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91–92, 
(1982) (invalidating a campaign finance law requiring disclosure of donations as applied 
to members of a minority party); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460 (prohibiting court-ordered dis-
closure of a membership list). 
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A. Protecting Disclosures About Matters of Public Concern 
 Tort claims that impose liability for speech are generally subject to 
a public concern balancing test.32 The public concern test balances the 
purpose of a statutory provision with the First Amendment’s goal of 
safeguarding expression, which can be chilled or limited by the threat 
of liability or sanction.33 In the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court justified allowing some false speech on 
matters of public concern to be published with impunity because of the 
potentially chilling effect of punishing false, defamatory speech on 
public discourse.34 All speech—even truthful speech—can be chilled by 
imposing liability for false speech.35 Thus, although false speech is not 
itself valuable, restricting it too much is unconstitutional because of the 
effect on public discourse as a whole.36 
 Although the Court has never precisely defined either public con-
cern, the category appears to refer primarily to political speech, namely 
direct political advocacy and speech related to elections.37 Usually, the 
phrase refers to issues in which the public has a legitimate concern.38 
In dicta, the Court has referred to political speech as central to the First 
Amendment.39 Thus, because the public concern test is grounded in 
the First Amendment’s strong protection of political speech, speakers 
disclosing information of public concern receive more protection than 
speakers disclosing other information.40 Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
2001 decision in Bartnicki, however, the cases protecting public disclo-
sure of information deemed private by state law all involved the press 
reporting information contained in government records.41 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (using a public concern text 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254 (using a public 
concern text for defamation); Chemerinksy, supra note 27, at 1044–62. A version of the 
public concern test is also used to define the scope of a government employee’s speech 
rights. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
33 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 254; see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (addressing the 
scope of the public concern test). In contrast the Court viewed filing a bankruptcy petition 
as a matter of more personal concern. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 
U.S. 749, 761 (1984). 
38 See id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that the public’s interest must be 
legitimate for the public concern test to apply). 
39 See Volokh, supra note 7, at 1095. 
40 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 1045. 
41 See Chemerinksy, supra note 27, at 1060. 
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 Bartnicki extended the public concern test to evaluate anti-
wiretapping statutes.42 In Bartnicki, two women who were campaigning 
for positions on a school board sued a local radio host under such a 
statute after he aired a surreptiously recorded conversation in which 
one women said, “If they’re not gonna move for three percent, we’re 
gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . . To blow off their front 
porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those guys.”43 In ex-
tending the public concern test to protect the radio host’s publication 
of the recording, the majority emphasized that the result was narrow 
because the press was not involved in the illegal recording and the tape 
involved information of public importance.44 The decision, however, 
was fractured and left unclear both the scope of the public concern test 
and the ability of private citizens to sue under anti-wiretapping stat-
utes.45 
W
     
1. hat Is the Scope of Content Protected by the Public Concern Test? 
 Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Bartnicki reveal that the Court disagrees about how to 
define a matter of public concern.46 Because the Bartnicki recording 
dealt with a political matter—a school board election—the majority 
assumed that protection for matters of public concern applied.47 Jus-
tice Breyer agreed, but he discussed in more depth the potential scope 
                                                                                                                 
42 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–18. 
43 See id. at 518–19 (alteration in original). 
44 See id. at 517. Analysis of public concern in Bartnicki relies on several other First 
Amendment cases involving freedom of the press. See id. at 528 (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, 
J., concurring)). Many scholars heavily criticize the role of the public concern test in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, in both the libel law context and the government employment 
context. See, e.g., Gerwirtz, supra note 12, at 167 (criticizing the public concern test applied 
in Bartnicki for failing to protect privacy); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the 
Reporter’s Privilege, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 515, 578–81 (2007) (rejecting the public concern test 
as a s privilege). Commentators criticize the public 
con
tnicki was splin-
tere ch at issue could be disclosed because it was merely “a 
mat
tnicki, 532 U.S. at 534. 
 way to determine the scope of reporter’
cern test for leaving private matters vulnerable to disclosure. See Gerwirtz, supra note 
12, at 167. 
45 See Gerwirtz, supra note 12, at 198. 
46 See Volokh, supra note 26, at 743 (explaining that the Court in Bar
d between holding that the spee
ter of public importance” or more narrowly because it was “of unusual public con-
cern”); see also Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534; id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
47 See Bar
1126 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1119 
of the protection for matters of public concern.48 His concurrence 
drew distinctions between public concern, legitimate public concern, 
and unusual public concern.49 Justice Breyer found that the public 
concern doctrine does not justify disclosing every famous person’s con-
versation.50 Moreover, Justice Breyer distinguished private conversa-
tions on matters of public concern from other issues of “truly private 
concern,” such as a video recording of sexual relations and the disclo-
sure of personal information about a divorce.51 Ultimately, the concur-
rence concluded that the disclosure of the recording should be pro-
tected because the information is of “unusual public concern,” consid-
ering that Ms. Bartnicki threatened physical harm to others by saying 
e 
r than an expansion of tort liability to punish truthful in-
rm
sh would have to “blow off [her opponents’] front porches.”52 
 Whether the scope of public concern includes only political 
speech or encompasses all speech that is not of “truly private concern” 
is significant because it determines how far the Bartnicki decision goes 
toward protecting the disclosure of illegally obtained recordings.53 Pro-
ponents of expanding the privacy torts, such as defamation and false 
light, rely on the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. to argue that plaintiffs may constitution-
ally seek damages for the disclosure of information of purely private 
concern.54 If disclosing matters of public concern is of paramount First 
Amendment importance, then a disclosure on a matter of purely pri-
vate concern is less protected speech, even if the disclosure is factually 
accurate.55 Proponents of expanded First Amendment rights, however, 
counter that Dun & Bradstreet represents a limited exception for false 
speech, rathe
fo ation.56 
 Dun & Bradstreet hinted at a more narrow definition of public con-
cern, which would not include all information of interest to the pub-
lic.57 There, the Court held that a confidential financial report, which 
                                                                                                                      
48 See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I write separately to explain why, in my view, 
the Court’s holding does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the 
media.”). 
49 See id. at 536, 540. 
50 See id. at 540. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 536. 
53 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
54 See 472 U.S. at 753; Gerwirtz, supra note 12, at 181 (supporting this view). But see Vo-
lokh, supra note 7, at 1095 (criticizing this view). 
55 See Volokh, supra note 7, at 1095. 
56 See id. 
57 See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. 
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mistakenly concluded that a company had filed for bankruptcy, was not 
a matter of public concern, presumably because speech about financial 
trouble is not core political speech.58 Thus, although the company’s 
bankruptcy would be of interest to certain segments of the public (the 
company’s creditors, employees, and customers), that interest in obtain-
ing the information does not justify allowing the disclosure of false in-
. H
ction of free 
e speaker, the interests of the media 
outle  in 
gain
                                                                                                                     
formation to avoid chilling speech on the subject.59 
2 ow Should Courts Define and Protect the Interests of Recorded 
Speakers? 
 All the opinions in Bartnicki identified privacy as the right protected 
by the anti-wiretapping statute.60 The majority found that public interest 
outweighed any privacy right that might have protected the conversa-
tion.61 Justice Breyer, however, characterized the privacy interest not on-
ly as involving the right to be let alone but also as an interest in fostering 
private speech.62 Breyer explained, “That assurance of privacy helps to 
overcome our natural reluctance to discuss private matters when we fear 
that our private conversations may become public. And the statutory 
restrictions consequently encourage conversations that otherwise might 
not take place.”63 According to Justice Breyer, the interest in fostering 
private speech is related to the First Amendment’s prote
expression.64 Thus, Justice Breyer tethered the interest in fostering pri-
vate expression to First Amendment, rather than privacy.65 
 To protect private expression, Justice Breyer proposed a balancing 
test which weighs the interests of th
t that distributed the speech, and the interests of the public
ing access to the conversation: 
I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance 
between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing con-
 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534; see id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 554 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“By protecting the privacy of individual thought and expres-
sion, [wiretapping] statutes further the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open speech of the 
private parties.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Volokh, supra note 26, 
at 743. 
61 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517. 
62 See id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
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sequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions on speech 
that are disproportionate when measured against their corre-
sponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into ac-
count the kind, the importance, and the extent of these bene-
nalysis 
would examine the content of the speech, the context in which it oc-
curred, 
rotecting a group’s right to determine their 
membership and message.71 These rights protect groups from both 
72 
tity to the public, expression can be chilled.73 The right to privacy in 
                                                                                                                     
fits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure 
those benefits?66 
Thus, Justice Breyer suggested that a proper First Amendment a
and the asserted interest in disclosing the information.67 
B. Associational Freedom, Anonymous Speech, and the Right  
to Control Your Audience 
 Facilitating anonymous expression or private expression meant for 
a limited group is one speech-enhancing effect of an anti-wiretapping 
law.68 The First Amendment recognizes the right to associate and the 
right to speak anonymously because these protections encourage the 
expression of minority views and expression of diverse views.69 To cre-
ate a viable space for advocacy of controversial viewpoints, the First 
Amendment protects individuals from the disclosure of their group 
affiliations or their identities if they choose to speak anonymously.70 
The right to associational freedom also protects the autonomy of ex-
pressive associations by p
unwanted disclosure and compelled speech.
1. Protection Against Disclosure of Identity 
 When the government requires the disclosure of a speaker’s iden-
 
66 Id. 
67 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
68 See id. 
69 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647 (“[I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit 
of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”). 
70 See id. at 647–48. 
71 See id. 
72 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 
(1995) (protecting a group from compelled speech); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460 (protecting a 
group from unwanted disclosure). 
73 See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 98 (holding that the disclosure of a speaker’s identity 
chills association); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460 (same). 
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one’s associations is closely tied to the First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously.74 Much like the right to expressive association generally, 
anonymous speech is particularly valuable for marginalized or unpopu-
lar groups.75 In the Revolutionary-era anonymous speech made the 
publication of Common Sense possible, and afterwards it facilitated the 
central role of the Federalist Papers in the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.76 As Justice Hugo Black noted, “[P]ersecuted groups . . . from 
time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive 
nt, 
ut a
st of its members in response to a court order.83 The Court 
expl n
                                                                                                                     
practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”77 
 When people speak in groups where they expect the content of 
their conversations to remain secret, the right to free association and 
anonymous speech coalesce.78 The ability to speak freely sometimes 
rests on the knowledge that your speech will only circulate within a 
small group.79 Thus, the harm caused by the unwanted disclosure of 
information can be just as salient when the information is given to a 
third party as when it is given to the government.80 Although the First 
Amendment only directly prohibits state action, First Amendment 
rights protect speakers not only against disclosure to the governme
b lso against government-facilitated disclosures to the public.81 
 For example, the First Amendment protects groups against gov-
ernment-compelled disclosure of membership lists.82 In 1958 the Su-
preme Court decided NAACP v. Alabama, holding that the NAACP 
could assert the associational rights of its members by refusing to dis-
close a li
ai ed: 
 Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
 
74 See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 98; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
75 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
76 See id.; see also Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards 
for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 833, 836 (2010) (discussing the 
important role of anonymous speech in American history). 
77 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. 
78 See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 98; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
79 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. 
80 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L.J. 821, 864 
(2008) (“The most powerful—though perhaps not the most obvious—speech ‘regulations’ 
are social norms and mores, backed by the threat of social ostracism or sanction. Most 
speakers fear not prosecution nor exclusion from public forums, but approbation and 
ostracism from friends, family members, employers, and fellow citizens.”). 
81 See id. 
82 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
83 Id. 
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group association, as this Court has more than once recog-
nized by remarking upon the close nexus between the free-
in to political, eco-
giving legal sanction to disclosures that 
done anything illegal.94 Some courts have expressed concern that law-
                                                                                                                     
doms of speech and assembly. 
 . . . [F]reedom to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of . . . free-
dom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs 
sought to be advanced by association perta
nomic, religious or cultural matters . . . .84 
The Court recognized the vital relationship between privacy in one’s 
associations and the freedom to associate.85 Many forms of governmen-
tal action may unintentionally result in abridgement of these rights.86 
Significantly, the state action in NAACP that violated associational free-
dom was a court’s contempt order requiring disclosure of membership 
lists.87 In this way, NAACP is factually similar to Bartnicki because both 
the Alabama court order for production at issue in NAACP and the 
Bartnicki Court’s holding that the distribution of an illegal recording 
was lawful have the effect of 
abridge associational rights.88 
 Furthermore, associational freedom has become increasingly im-
portant online.89 One area where courts face the compelled disclosure 
of identity is the unmasking of anonymous online speakers through 
their Internet service providers (ISPs).90 In lawsuits involving anony-
mous Internet speech, a plaintiff’s right to seek redress conflicts with a 
defendant’s right to speak anonymously.91 In order to proceed with his 
claim, the plaintiff must find a way to discover the anonymous speaker’s 
identity.92 Usually, plaintiffs serve a discovery subpoena on an ISP or 
the host of a website.93 Unmasking anonymous online speakers in this 
process can conflict with the right to speak anonymously online by forc-
ing speakers to reveal their identity without clear proof that they have 
 
84 Id. at 460 (citations omitted). 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
89 See infra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
90 See Mazzotta, supra note 76, at 839. 
91 See id. at 840. 
92 See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 
Yale L.J. 320, 329 (2008); Mazzotta, supra note 76, at 839. 
93 See Mazzotta, supra note 76, at 843. 
94 See id.; Gleicher, supra note 92, at 329. 
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suits like these could be misused to silence critics and chill anonymous 
speech online.95 
 Indeed, many states have passed statutes prohibiting “Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (anti-SLAPP statutes) where 
companies attempt to use lawsuits to unmask anonymous online speak-
ers in an attempt to silence their speech.96 These statutes recognize that 
the disclosure of a speaker’s identity—even through private action—can 
pose a significant threat to free expression.97 Disclosure to third parties 
can implicate First Amendment values, even where the state’s action is 
limited to the discovery process.98 
2. Protection Against Expanded Membership and Compelled Expression 
 Associations’ rights to control their expression are similar to, and 
nearly as strongly protected as, the rights of groups and individuals 
against disclosure.99 Control over membership and message are key to 
facilitating a group’s private expression.100 They allow the group to con-
trol the terms on which they speak to the outside world (by defining 
their message) and the people with whom they choose to share their 
message privately (by controlling their membership).101 
 In the 1994 case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, the Supreme Court held that the government could not 
compel private parade organizers to include unwanted individuals in 
                                                                                                                      
95 See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 756, 461 (Del. 2005) (rejecting First Amend-
ment balancing); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 759, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (balancing the defendant’s right of anonymous speech against the plain-
tiff’s prima facie case and the need to disclose the anonymous speaker’s identity); see also 
Gleicher, supra note 92, at 329 (“A defendant who is exposed could be subject to reprisals 
or severe social and professional sanctions, making extreme care necessary when exposing 
potentially innocent defendants.”). 
96 See Matt C. Sanchez, Note, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale Against 
Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 301, 
313 (2008). 
97 See id. 
98 See Gleicher, supra note 92, at 329. 
99 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 769 (comparing the substance of rights against dis-
closure of one’s membership in an organization to the substance of rights against govern-
mental monitoring). 
100 See id. 
101 See Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big 
Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 First Amendment L. Rev. 234, 235 
(2007) (examining compelled speech and associational freedom, and arguing in favor of a 
speaker’s right to choose her audience and hence to choose not to speak to the govern-
ment). 
1132 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1119 
their parade.102 Central to the Court’s decision was the parade organ-
izer’s right not to speak.103 Forced inclusion of an unwanted group in 
the parade would require the private organizers to convey a message 
with which they disagreed.104 
 In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
and affirmed the rights of expressive associations to determine their 
own membership and policies.105 The court observed,  
“[I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by 
the First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate 
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” This 
right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its 
views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps 
unpopular, ideas.106 
 The types of groups protected by the right to free association are 
cast broadly.107 Associations do not have to associate for the purpose of 
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protec-
tions of the First Amendment.108 An association must merely engage in 
expressive activity that could be impaired.109 Significantly, Boy Scouts 
gave great deference to the association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.110 
II. The Challenges of Online Speech: New Audiences and New 
Forms of Association 
 First Amendment scholars have written extensively on the impact 
of the Internet on freedom of speech.111 This Part attempts to provide 
a brief summary of the theories driving legal scholars to conclude that 
                                                                                                                      
102 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648. 
106 Id. at 647 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). 
107 Id. at 648. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 647. 
111 See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2004) (discussing the impact of the 
Internet on the First Amendment); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 
1137 (2009) (same); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Inter-
mediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 11 (2006) (same). 
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the Internet differs in significant ways from print and broadcast me-
dia.112 This review is not intended to be comprehensive but simply to 
highlight the major themes at work in the area.113 Significantly, online 
communication allows for the rapid dissemination of information in a 
way that makes it very hard for online speakers to choose or limit their 
audience as an offline speaker might.114 At the same time, however, 
online media facilitate communication between groups of people with 
similar interests, meaning most online speech is targeted toward a spe-
cific type of audience, such as people who like Beanie Babies or people 
who are interested in computer programming.115 
A. Social Media and Circulation 
 Some of the first online forums for expression were interactive.116 
Unlike traditional forms of media, bulletin boards, newsgroups, and 
discussion lists work like online conferences, which allow interested 
people to seek out a group centered around a particular topic and then 
to both contribute and consume information.117 In its infancy, most of 
the web was not fully interactive.118 Newsgroups were more like confer-
ences than newswires: users could discuss their ideas but could not 
widely disseminate them in real time.119 Moreover, communicating 
about a topic required meeting in a defined online location dedicated 
to that issue rather than accessing information aggregated in a single 
location based on your peer network and interests.120 
 Today, the Internet is more interactive.121 Social media provide 
self-publishing and distribution tools for any willing Internet user.122 
                                                                                                                      
112 See infra notes 116–192 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 116–192 and accompanying text. 
114 See Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 Yale L.J. 1613, 1614–15 (1995). 
115 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 34 (describing the simultaneously individualistic and 
collaborative nature of online communication). 
116 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener’s Perspective: Private 
Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 377, 378 
(“One of the most significant features of the new media is the interactive electronic con-
ference—bulletin board, newsgroup, discussion list, or the like. People who listen in on 
these conferences (and most participants spend much more of their time listening than 
speaking) want speech that’s relevant to their interests, readable, reliable, and not rude.”). 
117 See id. Although anyone can contribute, it is much more common to simply read or 
“lurk.” See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 382. 
120 See id. 
121 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 34 
122 See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1315, 1323–24 (2009). 
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Online communication is almost never unilateral.123 Web-based soft-
ware allows individuals to easily publish their own blog covering a 
broad range of subjects—from women’s experiences with motherhood 
to traditional political commentary.124 In addition to blogs and message 
boards, which are centered around a certain topic or political ideology, 
a wave of social networking sites allows users to select a group of friends 
or followers with whom to share photos, videos, and messages.125 For 
example, Facebook is a platform for speakers to share a wide variety of 
content with many different groups of friends.126 Twitter is designed to 
allow users to sift through information quickly to stay informed in their 
areas of interest in real time.127 Because Twitter users can pick which 
news sources to follow, Twitter functions like a newspaper with “head-
lines you will always find interesting.”128 
 Social media websites interact with one another to distribute a va-
riety of content widely and rapidly.129 Facebook users post links to You-
Tube videos to share them with their friends.130 Facebook users can 
also use applications to make their updates available on Twitter and 
reach a different audience.131 Because Facebook profits by selling the 
information its users share, Facebook has an incentive to encourage its 
users to disclose as much as possible.132 
                                                                                                                      
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. Users share status updates—short comments about anything—photos, videos, 
links to other websites, and information about themselves. See id. This content is shared 
with “friends” through a “news feed” that aggregates all updates to your friends’ pages and 
displays it on your homepage. See id. Users typically add “real-life” acquaintances as their 
friends or use Facebook as a way to reconnect or stay in touch with friends and family 
across the country or world. See id. 
127 About, Twitter, http://twitter.com/about (last visited May 11, 2012) (describing 
the website as “an easy way to discover the latest news about subjects you care about”). 
128 See id. Users communicate in messages called “tweets,” which must be 140 charac-
ters or less. See id. Unlike with Facebook, users do not “friend” each other; instead, indi-
vidual users can nonmutually decide whose tweets to “follow.” See id. 
129 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 748. 
130 Grimmelmann, supra note 111, at 1149. Youtube, founded in 2005, is the dominant 
video-sharing website. See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1313. YouTube videos are often pub-
licized on other social media sites or even using traditional offline media. See Grimmel-
mann, supra note 111, at 125. 
131 About, supra note 127. 
132 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1328. 
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B. Characteristics of Online Communication: “Narrowcasting”  
and Selective Attention 
 Because the Internet contains so much information, users select 
only sources in which they are interested, and not all users are con-
cerned with making their own information public.133 Contribution and 
collaboration are key to online expression and distinguish social media 
from traditional media.134 Because of the speed at which information 
travels online and the self-selecting, interactive nature of online com-
munication, online speech is uniquely capable of reaching a targeted 
group of people nearly instantly.135 
1. Internet Users Self-Select to Sift Through Data 
 Unlike other forms of media, like television where there is a scar-
city of bandwidth, the tremendous amount of information online leads 
to a scarcity of attention.136 As sources of information proliferate, com-
petition for Internet users’ limited attention increases, and well-funded 
commercial interests become more dominant.137 In 2010, web adver-
tisement reached an all-time high and brought advertisers more than 
$6.4 billion in revenue.138 Information on the Internet is so “obese” 
and overwhelming that surfing through the Internet in the same way 
we surf channels or select books from the library is impossible.139 Thus, 
most information on the Internet, although public, is not publicized—it 
remains hidden, buried beneath mounds of data.140 
 Thus, although Internet users assume that only people they target 
will view their information, they often make information available to the 
whole world.141 Posting information online is based on a cost-benefit 
calculation.142 The choice is comparable to the decision whether to list a 
phone number or to include your information in a voluntary student 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 7. 
134 See id. at 7, 34. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. at 7. 
137 See id. 
138 See Press Release, Internet Adver. Bureau, $6.4 Billion in Q3 2010 Sets New Record 
for Internet Advertising Revenues (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.iab.net/about_ 
the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-111710. 
139 See Kevin DeLuca & Jennifer Peeples, From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy, 
Activism, and the “Violence” of Seattle, 10 Critical Stud. Media Comm. 125, 132–33 (2002). 
140 See id. at 125–31. 
141 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1318. 
142 See id. 
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directory.143 For many, the benefit of making information available to 
any interested party outweighs the cost of allowing access to an unde-
fined group of people.144 
 Furthermore, the ability of users to generate their own content 
and disseminate information within social networks of their own choos-
ing makes Internet expression radically different from mass media ex-
pression.145 Although mass media like television shows and movies are 
necessarily broadcasted and received passively, Internet communication 
is often narrowcasted and interactive.146 Internet users build off other 
users’ expressions in a kind of combination and “bricolage” that makes 
Internet expression more about self-expression than previous media.147 
There is no need for online content to appeal to more than a small 
group of people because only those who want to listen are likely to se-
lect the content.148 
  Self-selection can be analogized to membership.149 Savvy Internet 
users subscribe to email list-servs or to the tweets of other Twitter us-
ers.150 To access the forums on the New York Times website or post videos 
on YouTube, you must be a member.151 This self-selection is a type of 
expressive association that mimics and magnifies offline forms of asso-
ciation.152 
2. By Allowing Information to Flow Rapidly Between Groups, Social 
Media Break Down Barriers Between Communities 
 By breaking down the space between offline communities, online 
communication makes it possible for information to leak from one 
group to another in a way that makes it difficult for speakers to control 
their audiences.153 Unlike offline association, there are no clear bounda-
ries for online expressive groups.154 One person’s tweet can be “re-
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 7–10. 
146 See id. at 8. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 10. 
149 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 752 (comparing subscribing to a list-serv to mem-
bership). 
150 See id.; see also About, supra note 127 (describing how to subscribe to a Twitter feed). 
151 See, e.g., Log in, N.Y. Times, https://myaccount.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http:// 
(last visited May 11, 2012); 1 Billion Subscriptions and Counting, YouTube Blog (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/10/1-billion-subscriptions-and-counting.html. 
152 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 752. 
153 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1329 (describing “blurry-edged” social networks). 
154 See id. 
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tweeted” and viewed by millions of people within a matter of hours.155 
Although individuals online can choose the information they seek and 
where they begin interacting with others, they have much less control 
over what happens with their speech once it is online.156 
 These properties of online communication change how informa-
tion circulates.157 Before the advent of the Internet, print media had a 
limited circulation—due to the amount of copies that could be printed 
and the physical distances between publisher and reader.158 Offline ex-
pressive associations often rely on the expectation of limited circula-
tion.159 For example, colleagues discussing the best way to change their 
work environment or the poor leadership of their superiors rely on 
their co-workers’ confidence.160 Otherwise, if the workers are at-will 
employees, the disclosure of that communication could lead to the loss 
of their jobs.161 Even speech eventually intended to be presented in 
public relies in some settings on a modicum of privacy or the fact of 
limited circulation.162 A high school debater might be uncomfortable if 
every college admission board could access videos of her first debate 
round, regardless of where the debate took place.163 
 Furthermore, the speed at which information may be loaded on to 
the Internet makes the Internet an ideal tool for rapidly disseminating 
information to likeminded people.164 The ease with which one can e-
mail, link to other messages, and publicly post content on forums de-
signed for quick, simple expression make communication not only in-
stant, but as easy to access and process as a bumper sticker.165 Digital 
                                                                                                                      
155 See, e.g., Viral Twitter Meme Makes You Wonder Who Actually Reads Your Tweets, Edudemic 
( Jan. 15, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://edudemic.com/2011/01/viral-twitter-meme/ (describing 
how one tweet got copied and pasted verbatim around 1500 times in an hour). 
156 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 8. 
157 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 
968 (2005) (explaining that the Internet facilitates more rapid dissemination of new in-
formation). 
158 See id. at 922 (explaining how the structure of social networks affects expectations 
of privacy about communication). 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 See Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 968. 
164 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 750; see also, e.g., Eric Weiner, Jena 6 Movement 
Gained Momentum Online, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.npr.org/tem 
plates/story/story.php?storyId=14658077 (explaining how a social justice movement util-
ized social networking technology to organize protests across the country within a matter 
of days). 
165 See Strandburg, supra note 20, at 750. 
1138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1119 
communication lowers the cost of collective activity and decreases the 
importance of geographic proximity.166 People can mobilize in any size 
or geographic scale and form groups dedicated to specific issues and 
then dissolve quickly.167 Online groups can “piggyback” on social net-
works or organized affiliations to rapidly penetrate a specific target au-
dience; for example, a speaker could use their school’s social network 
to direct a message to all their classmates or mention a famous music 
artist in a tweet to promote a band to people who like similar music.168 
C. Information Leaks and the Problem of Controlling Your Audience 
 Many scholars recognize that privacy is difficult to adapt to the In-
ternet because the Internet lacks spatial boundaries.169 Offline percep-
tions of seclusion and space are central to how experience privacy be-
cause they create barriers between people that can wall off individuals 
from a speaker.170 Because offline speech often relies on physical space 
to define its audience, transferring offline speech online allows the 
online distributer to radically redefine the audience of the offline 
speaker.171 Speakers have “on-stage” and “off-stage” personas—a face for 
the broad public and a face for people close to them.172 Speakers wear 
many masks—one for the classroom, one for their family, and one for 
their book club, for example.173 The way in which speakers conceive 
their acts of communication to each group would be different if speak-
ers had a conception of communicative space that allowed their expres-
sion to be disclosed outside of these physical spaces.174 
 The potential for information leaks creates an undefined circula-
tion and distribution for any online content, which makes it difficult 
for speakers to define their audiences on the Internet.175 Although 
speakers are free to target whatever groups they wish, there is no easy 
way to guarantee that their speech will not leak outside those defined 
groups.176 Even when a speaker opts to password protect a video or 
                                                                                                                      
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 1, 17–25 (2007). 
170 See id. at 18. 
171 See id. at 17. 
172 See Gerwitz, supra note 12, at 167. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1329. 
176 See id. 
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make it viewable only to close friends, the digital file can frequently be 
reposted elsewhere.177 
 Moreover, users posting videos of other people may lack the incen-
tive to carefully guard the speech of others.178 Speakers do not need 
any significant resources to become online journalists or entertainers, 
beyond an iPhone or a Blackberry and an Internet connection.179 Ad-
ditionally, the relative anonymity of the Internet means that members 
of groups that form rapidly around a particular message are difficult to 
identify and the people who leak individual recordings are hard to 
find.180 This anonymity facilitates disclosures that might not otherwise 
happen.181 
 “Going viral” is the most significant way in which the video format 
differs from textual media.182 Offline, spreading information to new 
people requires time, effort, and substantial connections.183 In contrast, 
the Internet allows a single piece of information to be shared with a 
million people simultaneously.184 If the information stimulates enough 
interest, it “goes viral” and spreads throughout many social networks.185 
Viral phenomena are almost exclusive to the Internet because social 
media allow gossip to hit a tipping point by distributing information to 
a critical mass of people.186 
 For example, after a woman let her dog defecate in a subway in 
South Korea without picking it up, an enterprising camera phone own-
er posted the evidence online.187 The result was a public shaming of 
the dog owner on the South Korean blogosphere.188 The camera man 
did not know the dog owner, but because the Internet enabled him to 
post the information for anyone, he could easily reach everyone in the 
                                                                                                                      
177 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 10. 
178 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 966. 
179 See id. at 927. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See Daniel Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on 
the Internet 124 (2007). Going viral is when a video spreads rapidly to a broader online 
audience. See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 927. 
185 See Solove, supra note 182, at 60; Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 957 (explaining 
how certain people in social networks become “supernodes,” thus acting as hubs for trans-
ferring and filtering information). 
186 See Solove, supra note 182, at 60. 
187 Lipton, supra note 9, at 921; see also Dog Poop Girl, Famous Pictures, http://www. 
famouspictures.org/index.php?title=Dog_Poop_Girl (last modified Jan. 18, 2012). 
188 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 921. 
1140 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1119 
dog owner’s social networks.189 Some traditional South Korean news 
outlets reported that the uproar led the woman to drop out of her uni-
versity.190 
                                                                                                                     
 This story illustrates how posting offline speech online can func-
tion as a kind of outing by exposing the identity of the recorded sub-
ject.191 Using current technology, any willing camera phone journalist 
can effectively reveal not only the members of a specific organization 
but also the precise content of their messages—instantly expanding the 
audience of an offline speaker.192 
III. Replacing the Public Concern Test with an  
Associational Freedom Approach 
 Because the public concern test is a poor fit for First Amendment 
values, it should not be extended to online speech.193 The public con-
cern test undervalues both the rights of individuals to receive and dis-
seminate information and the associational rights of offline speakers to 
control the audience that receives their speech.194 Using public con-
cern as the touchstone for disclosure fails to account for the fact that 
the content of a conversation may have differing value for the literal 
speaker and the listener.195 These overlapping speech interests cannot 
be fairly accounted for under a public concern framework.196 
 The proliferation of cell phone cameras and other tiny data re-
cording devices makes the right to choose one’s audience elusive.197 
The ability to take a piece of communication out of its original context 
and subsequently expose it to a much broader audience damages not 
 
189 See id. 
190 Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame, Wash. 
Post, July 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/0 
6/AR2005070601953.html. 
191 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 921. 
192 See id. 
193 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 44, at 578–81 (arguing that the public concern test 
should not be used to define the scope of a reporter’s privilege); Volokh, supra note 7, at 
1097 (arguing that the public concern test has failed to protect First Amendment rights in 
every context where it has been applied). 
194 See Gerwirtz, supra note 12, at 153 (arguing that the public concern test allows too 
much disclosure); Volokh, supra note 26, at 743–46 (arguing that the public concern test 
does not allow enough disclosure). 
195 See Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 923 (explaining how private conversations pro-
mote “friendship and intimacy” for speakers); Volokh, supra note 7, at 1093 (explaining 
that hearing commentary on “daily life matters” helps listeners form opinions on impor-
tant topics). 
196 See Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 923; Volokh, supra note 7, at 1093. 
197 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 927. 
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only the boundaries between public and private, but also the bounda-
ries between different social groups.198 Speech intended for the class-
room will be received differently in a church or on a Facebook page.199 
Social media technology makes it possible for an online video to give 
information about an expressive association to an entire social network 
and potentially the whole world.200 
 Thus, at least as conventionally understood the dichotomy between 
speech of public concern and speech of private concern is no longer 
useful.201 Online and offline speakers often understand their audiences 
as subjectively defined, semi-private communities.202 Thus, courts 
should abandon the fiction that speech concerning a homogeneous, 
politically defined public is the most valuable speech and instead should 
consider the particular communities or “publics” within which speakers 
and listeners are situated.203 For yoga enthusiasts, the most valuable 
speech might concern the safety of their yoga practice, yet for a gradu-
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200 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1329 (explaining how social media encourage users 
to share information with friends and in the process make data more broadly available). 
201 See id. at 1328, 1329, 1336. 
202 See id. at 1326 (arguing online social networking tools allow users to define their 
“blurry-edged social networks”); Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 969 (arguing that speakers’ 
expectations of privacy depend on the group of people with which they are communicat-
ing). 
203 See Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 923 (arguing that courts should use social net-
work analysis to determine when to punish disclosure); Volokh, supra note 7, at 1092–93. 
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the American public. In reality, however, our subjectively defined communities are also 
publics. 
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ate student, the most valuable speech might concern the method of de-
termining financial aid at her school.204 
                                                                                                                     
 Limiting the dissemination of some “public” conversations may be 
vital to protecting freedom of speech and association.205 Statutes that 
prohibit surreptitious recordings seek to protect communication from 
disclosure to private parties and the government.206 Thus, expressive 
association also protects individuals against governmental disclosures to 
the public, not just the government’s collection of information for 
criminal investigations.207 A lack of effective, private association would 
decrease the anonymity and candor of certain groups and thus free ex-
pression.208 Peer groups, employers, and communities can be effective 
censors.209 
 Initially, Section A discusses how the public concern test fails to 
allow enough disclosure and is thus under-inclusive, because it is de-
signed to capture the interests of broadcast media and geographically 
organized publics.210 It thus fails to accurately capture the interests of 
online “publics” which may be interested in receiving the information 
and communication with the publisher.211 Section B examines how the 
public concern approach allows too much disclosure and is thus over-
inclusive because it does not recognize the right of speakers to speak 
privately on matters of public concern.212 It thus fails to protect literal 
speakers against surreptitious recordings.213 Finally, Section C argues 
 
204 See Strahilevitz, supra note 157, at 923. 
205 See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982) 
(prohibiting campaign finance law’s disclosure of donations as applied to members of a 
minority party); see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (prohibiting court-
ordered disclosure of a membership list). 
206 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 553–54 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“By protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression, [wiretapping] statutes 
further the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open speech of the private parties.” (citations 
and internal quotations omitted)). 
207 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460 (holding that the privacy of the NAACP’s membership 
lists facilitated the group’s expressive association); Strandburg, supra note 20, at 744 (argu-
ing the amount of information available online threatens to chill the expressive associa-
tion). 
208 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; Strandburg, supra note 20, at 744. 
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that because someone’s interest in discussing even a controversial issue 
with a limited group of people is central to freedom of association, an 
expressive association approach that protects conversations regardless 
of subject-matter would be more consistent with First Amendment val-
ues than the public concern test.214 
A. Many Online Publics: The Public Concern Test Is Under-Inclusive 
 The public concern test is under-inclusive because online speakers 
often select multiple “publics” with which to communicate and these 
“publics” are not necessarily defined by an interest in core political 
speech.215 Because broadcast media communicate with audiences de-
fined primarily by geography—a local television or radio station broad-
casts to a particular city and a national station to a particular country— 
it is possible to imagine that broadcast media can communicate about 
political issues relevant to a given area, such as school board candidates 
or a national congressional candidate.216 In contrast, online videos are 
likely to be relevant to a segment of the public defined by a specific in-
terest or set of interests.217 Thus, someone disclosing information 
online may wish to speak to a particular “public,” which is not organ-
ized around a geographic political unit.218 Both the speaker and the 
“public” nonetheless have legitimate expressive interests in receiving or 
communicating information.219 Furthermore, the speech interests of 
an individual who shares information is considerably harder to define 
than the interest of a broadcast media outlet.220 
 The problem of interlocking publics and the individualistic, inter-
active nature of online speech make the public concern test a poor 
method for determining whether a recording can be disseminated with 
impunity.221 Because the public concern test is applied in the same way 
regardless of whether the entity disclosing the information is a member 
of the broadcast media or an Internet user, determining whether some-
thing posted online is of “legitimate public concern” is no longer teth-
                                                                                                                      
214 See infra notes 281–305 and accompanying text. 
215 See Gelman, supra note 122, at 1329; Volokh, supra note 7, at 1092–93. 
216 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 3–4 (contrasting broadcast media with the Internet). 
217 See id. For example, an online speaker might communicate with his or her group of 
friends from college or Star Wars fans or both at the same time. See id. 
218 See id. For example, in Bartnicki the “public” was organized around a local school 
board election. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519. 
219 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
220 See Volokh, supra note 26, at 747. 
221 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 3 (discussing the interactive, personal nature of online 
expression); Gelman, supra note 122, at 1329. 
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ered to the original purposes of the test: assessing whether the audi-
ence has a legitimate interest in receiving the disclosure.222 Unlike tra-
ditional media that are broadcast to the public at large, social media 
capitalize on narrowcasting to interlocking social groups to disseminate 
information.223 
 Most courts fail to acknowledge that nongeographically organized 
groups with similar interests can be legitimate online publics when 
evaluating whether a disclosure is a matter of public concern.224 For 
example, in the 2003 case DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, the Su-
preme Court of California held that the publication of a computer 
source code was expressive conduct because it was a means for ex-
changing information and ideas about computer programming.225 The 
court concluded that publication of the code could be enjoined be-
cause the source code was not posted to “comment on any public issue 
or to participate in any public debate” and “only computer encryption 
enthusiasts are likely to have an interest in the expressive content” ra-
ther than the use of the source code.226 Because the disclosure of this 
“highly technical information” added nothing to the public debate, the 
source code publisher’s expressive conduct did not “substantially relate 
to a legitimate matter of public concern.”227 
 The Bunner court, however, did not justify why highly technical in-
formation cannot be of legitimate public concern or add to the public 
debate.228 The court acknowledged that the First Amendment protects 
speech about science in addition to political speech.229 The court also 
acknowledged that the source code could be of interest to a small sec-
tion of the public— “computer encryption enthusiasts” like engineers 
and academics.230 This small segment of the population, although not 
defined with reference to a political unit, potentially represents a large 
online public.231 Entire online publications and communities are de-
                                                                                                                      
222 See Chemerinksy, supra note 27, at 1044–45 (explaining the origins of the public 
concern test); Volokh, supra note 26, at 747 (arguing that as currently applied, the public 
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223 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
224 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10 (Cal. 2003); see also Volokh, su-
pra note 26, at 745–46 (commenting on Bunner). 
225 See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10. 
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228 Id. at 10. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. at 16. 
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voted to discussing material relevant to programmers.232 The govern-
ment estimates that there are 680,000 self-described computer pro-
grammers in the United States as of 2010.233 It is not a stretch to imag-
ine that more people could be interested in source code than the 
statements of someone running for a local school board.234 
 Choosing to speak on an issue of narrow, technical appeal rather 
than one of broad, general appeal should not affect the quantum of 
constitutional protection afforded to speech because it should not be 
up to courts to decide what is merely entertainment and what is of true 
substance, just as it is not the judiciary’s business to distinguish between 
lyrics and vulgarity.235 Social networking technology and the rise of spe-
cialized forums for expression on certain subjects are evidence of how 
people use the Internet to communicate with a group of people hand-
picked to hear a particular message.236 Although limiting mass media 
news outlets to disclosing information that is of interest to their broad-
cast audience may be a fair way to characterize the speech interests of 
the broadcast media, online speakers’ interests are different than those 
of news outlets speaking to a broadcast audience.237 Because online 
speech is so diverse and individualized and because online communica-
tion choices are more personal than those of media corporations and 
journalists, judgments about what constitutes a legitimate public con-
cern are inappropriate.238 
 Thus, using the public concern test to identify the speech interests 
of literal speakers, online speech distributers, and potential online lis-
teners fails to adequately protect the speech interests of both online 
speakers and listeners as well as offline literal speakers.239 Both those 
                                                                                                                      
232 See, e.g., About, Source Forge, http://sourceforge.net/about (last visited May 11, 
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who wish to discuss something and those who wish to disseminate that 
discussion have First Amendment interests, which may not have any-
thing to do with participating in a public debate.240 The interests of 
these speakers do not suddenly become more or less relevant because 
the group interested in a piece of expression is not organized around a 
political or geographic unit.241 Frequently, the motivation of an indi-
vidual to post something on the Internet has little to do with participat-
ing in public debate.242 
B. Associational Rights Against Disclosure: The Public  
Concern Test Is Overinclusive 
 The right to choose one’s audience and mode of communication 
is an expressive choice.243 Choosing the context in which one speaks is 
an important element of the First Amendment’s freedom of associa-
tion.244  If a speaker or association expects anonymity or confidential-
ity or attempts to create a safe space for the discussion of controversial 
ideas, the core of the right to free association is implicated and disclo-
sure should be punishable.245 Unfortunately, the public concern test 
immunizes disclosures from punishment whenever the expression is on 
a matter of public concern, regardless of any counterveiling rights of 
the recorded literal speaker.246 Some groups, however, rely on confi-
dentiality or anonymity as a way to encourage openness and facilitate 
in-group expression.247 Limited circulation of information can encour-
age disclosure on sensitive, personal issues as well as facilitate minority 
expression.248 To explore situations where the rights to control one’s 
audience is challenged by the disclosure of communications of expres-
sive associations, this Section examines two different types of groups 
                                                                                                                      
240 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (1999) (“[I]mplicit in the right to 
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246 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519. 
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and the damage unwanted disclosures cause.249 The first group relies 
on limited circulation to facilitate personal disclosure and the second 
group to facilitate the expression of minority political views.250 
 The first group relies on confidentiality to encourage openness 
and personal disclosure.251 Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, relies 
on anonymity and norms of mutual nondisclosure in order to encour-
age participants to self-disclose to other members of the group.252 
Groups like these may not seek to advance ideas of either public con-
cern or purely private concern, but nonetheless deserve protection 
against disclosure.253 Even if the individuals involved are famous or if 
the incidents they discuss are matters of public concern, disclosure can 
undermine the expressive purpose of the group.254 For example, if a 
public official went to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting and admitted 
to drunk driving, an anti-wiretapping statute should be able to prevent 
publication of a recording of the confession.255 Such a recording could 
be a serious violation of the group’s culture.256 Some privacy scholars 
theorize that disclosing the contents of such a group’s communication 
would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, although state law is 
inconsistent on this point.257 
 Associational freedom ought to affirmatively protect the commu-
nications of such groups against disclosure.258 Hearing the stories of 
other members could be considered an important incident of member-
ship.259 In this sense, the individual’s right to control his or her audi-
ence is the right to choose to communicate only with the group as de-
fined by its own membership.260 In the case of Alcoholics Anonymous, 
for example, members have chosen only to share their stories with oth-
er people who struggle with addiction.261 Disclosing the contents of 
                                                                                                                      
249 See infra notes 251–280 and accompanying text. 
250 See infra notes 251–280 and accompanying text. These two examples are not the on-
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such communication could be even more harmful than disclosing 
membership lists because of the detail of the information revealed— 
listeners would learn not merely someone’s chosen affiliation but the 
exact substance of his or her expression.262 Moreover, the right to speak 
encompasses a right not to speak.263 Clearly when “anonymous” is in 
the name of the group, it is clear that members do not intend to speak 
to the world at large.264 
 Second, some groups rely on confidentiality and anonymity to fa-
cilitate wide-open debate on controversial issues.265 Extending First 
Amendment protection against disclosure to the communications of 
unpopular or controversial groups would serve the same purpose as 
protecting membership lists from disclosure: protecting minority ex-
pression.266 A classic example of speech that occurs in a secluded place 
but is on a matter of public concern is the speech of secret societies like 
the Freemasons.267 These groups associate for the purpose of express-
ing often controversial opinions.268 Indeed, the nation’s founders likely 
participated in similar groups and would have likely imagined that the 
activities of such groups would be protected by the freedom of assem-
bly.269 Many less infamous organizations, such as high school and col-
lege debating groups, also rely on remaining hidden from public view 
to create laboratories for controversial ideas.270 Such groups are also 
analogous to an NAACP chapter in Alabama during the civil rights 
movement; keeping their memberships and the contents of their meet-
ing secret protects unpopular groups not only from the government, 
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but also from a hostile general public.271 Because the disclosure of a 
recording not only reveals the identity of speakers but also the exact 
content of their communications, it is maximally intrusive to associa-
tional and expressive rights.272 
  Thus, expressive associations should be safeguarded from disclo-
sures that radically expand the audience of the in-group communica-
tion by acknowledging a right not to speak outside the context of a 
group’s membership.273 Protecting this right facilitates minority expres-
sion.274 Some groups are meant to function as safe spaces not for per-
sonal disclosure but for the discussion of controversial ideas.275 For in-
stance, political debating societies can function as important laborato-
ries for ideas.276 In these situations, assigning a statutory responsibility 
to keep the communication of the group secret through an anti-wire-
tapping statute furthers free speech values by protecting subordinated 
social groups which are often pushed to the margins of mainstream 
discourse, from public exclusion or ridicule.277 Applying the public 
concern test in these situations could lead to bizarre results.278 For ex-
ample, if political advocacy is a matter of public concern, an anti-
wiretapping statute could not constitutionally punish someone who dis-
closed an illegally recorded video of an NAACP or Socialist Worker’s 
party meeting to the public.279 Even though a court would be constitu-
tionally prohibited from requiring a group to produce a membership 
list during civil discovery, a state could not punish an individual who 
illegally disclosed a video of a group meeting to the whole world.280 
C. Associational Freedom Offers a More Appropriate Framework to Evaluate 
Whether an Online Disclosure Should Be Prohibited 
 Litigants using anti-wiretapping statutes or similar causes of action 
to sue an entity who discloses their conversations can avoid constitu-
tional bars on their claims by arguing that the statute as applied serves 
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a compelling state purpose—protecting expressive association.281 An 
associational freedom framework has the distinct advantage of being 
able to distinguish based on context and audience rather than relying 
on distinctions between private and public location or between private 
and public concern.282 The associational freedom framework can oper-
ate where privacy does not, cannot, and should not reach.283 Moreover, 
this approach can categorically refuse to protect nonexpressive conduct 
from disclosure.284 
 This Note proposes a two-part test.285 As a threshold inquiry, courts 
should determine if the disclosed recording contains expressive activ-
ity.286 If so, courts should weigh the value of the disclosure against two 
important values of associational freedom: (1) the extent to which dis-
closure of the speech tends to chill speech similar to the speech at issue 
and (2) the extent to which speech designed for a limited audience 
could be properly understood by a broader audience.287 These are as-
sociational rights to the extent that individuals have a right not to dis-
close their associations to the world at large and to the extent that asso-
ciational freedom protects the ability of organizations to control their 
membership.288 
 Relying on First Amendment cases about membership and non-
disclosure gives courts a solid constitutional framework to balance the 
right of speakers to control their audience, the right of media outlets 
and individuals to disclose recordings, and the right of interested par-
ties to view the recordings.289 Although using associational freedom 
cases would not give clear results in every case, it does provide courts 
with a body of case law that defines a recognized right—free associa-
tion.290 Because privacy values are not only politically controversial but 
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their extent varies widely on the state level, they are a less stable foun-
dation on which to decide these cases.291 
 Furthermore, protecting only expressive conduct is a distinct bene-
fit of an expressive association approach to evaluating the constitutional-
ity of laws that punish the dissemination of surreptitious recordings.292 
Initially, the reach of this approach is not overly broad and does not re-
strict the dissemination of nonexpressive conduct that is of interest to 
the public.293 If conduct occurs in public but is otherwise nonexpres-
sive, the information may be readily disclosed.294 This approach keeps 
two important types of recordings within the public domain: videos of 
official misconduct and “blooper” videos.295 There is high demand for 
both these kinds of recordings, suggesting that listeners may have a 
strong interest in the consumption of such videos.296 The expressive as-
sociation approach would allow a significant amount of recordings to be 
disclosed because it does not protect nonexpressive activity, making it a 
considerable departure from the public concern test.297 
                                                                                                                     
 Many videos that go viral online do so because of their entertain-
ment value.298 This “blooper” category of video can be freely distributed 
online because it contains no expressive conduct.299 For example, the 
woman in the aforementioned dog defecation scenario did not engage 
in any expressive activity because she neither spoke nor created the re-
cording.300 There is, however, a free speech value to people discussing 
codes of conduct among dog owners.301 Her public shaming expressed 
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a moral conviction that owners should clean up after their dogs and 
thus plays an important role in developing social obligation
 Moreover, the same logic that applies to “bloopers” would apply to 
public officials engaged in nonexpressive conduct in public.303 In the 
2001 case Commonwealth v. Hyde, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held a state statute could constitutionally be used to punish a 
Massachusetts resident who secretly recorded a brutal encounter with 
police.304 Under this Note’s two-part test, however, the wiretapping stat-
ute would be unconstitutional as applied to such a situation: because 
carrying out one’s job as a police officer is not expressive conduct, the 
police officers would not have any First Amendment claim to counter-
balance the First Amendment right of someone else to distribute the 
video.305 
Conclusion 
 The First Amendment’s protection for public discourse sharply 
contrasts with the First Amendment’s protection of private expressive 
association. Furthermore, the wide availability of video and audio re-
cording technology, coupled with the ability of individuals to rapidly 
and widely disseminate information to both their peers and others 
makes collision between these two values inevitable in the digital age. 
The best way to resolve this conflict is to abandon the public concern 
test and focus instead on the associational rights of recorded speakers. 
Because the Internet has forever changed not only how people com-
municate, but also how many people they can communicate with in-
stantly, the First Amendment must provide sufficient breathing space 
between private expression and instant online disclosure to effectively 
promote the robust, wide-open discourse at the heart of free expression. 
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